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Violence against clinics and medical personnel performing abortions has increased. The federal government has increased the penalties against the perpetrators and also has taken other measures. An evaluation team gathers to assess the effectiveness of these measures. One member of the team, like many others in this nation, is strongly "pro-life," believing that under the Nuremberg and other rulings, any action is justified in preventing what this person regards as the slaughter of innocents. This team member sees the government as protecting "murderers," believing the general welfare and public good demand closure of the clinics. Another team member, like many others in this nation, is strongly "prochoice," believing that law and ethics give a woman control over her own body and regarding violence against the clinics and medical personnel as criminal, not heroic. To this team member, ensuring the general welfare and public good requires the protection of clinics offering abortions. Both members call themselves evaluators. Should either of these evaluators participate in or lead the evaluation?
For this chapter, I have been asked to examine arguments €or and against evaluation neutrality and advocacy To explore these issues I have looked primarily at articles by past presidents of the American Evaluation Association and other prorninent figures in our field. There is an abundance of prior words on this topic, some of which will be summarized in the next sections. Sorting through them, what struck me was not their dissimilarity but-with some exceptio-their agreement after one had worked through the definitions given of advocacy and neutrality. Nonetheless, some of the discourse on the ethics of advocacy in evaluation seems to take place as though the moral high ground had room for only one banner.
Why the passion, given the common ground? One reason may be the potential for common ground in theory to get "balkanized in practice. A second interesting only in conflicted cases" (p. 27). The AEA conference sessions on ethical questions and how various evaluators would address them (Morris, 1997; Nelkin, 1995) as well as the "Ethical Challenges" series in the American Journal of Evaluution represent exceptionally valuable means to this good end, as are reports such as Bell (1997) and Bickman (1996) .
In a Great State, the legislature decides to go with charter schools and vouchers, so parents can send their child to the school of their choice: public, private, parochial. The stated intents are to improve student learning, improve the quality of a 1 education, improve public confidence in and support of education, and equalize the playing field by ethnicity and family income in opportunities to learn. An evaluation team is asked to judge the merit, worth, and value of the program as implemented in achieving the benefits sought. One member of the team is strongly pro-choice, believing that social justice and equity require giving charter schools and vouchers a chance. Another member of the team is strongly anti-choice, believing that the best way to improve public education is to improve public educalim and lhat the school choice program will drain brains and money from already beleaguered public schools.
Should either of these evaluators participate in the study? My answer is that in a study such as this and the abortion clinic scenario that began this chapter, one way-but not the only way-of ensuring balance, fairness, and a less corruptible evaluation is that the team include both evaluators (see also Bell, 1997; Datta, 1997) .
The team as a whole should make clear to the school board and all stakeholders their diversiLy of beliefs, how their differences may affect and improve the evaluation, and what else they will do to be in compliance with Principle C (revised): Evaluators should be impartial, taking steps to promote the fairness, balance and justice of the entire evaluation process.
